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CHAPTER 10 
Contracts and Commercial Law 
DONNA M. SHERRY· 
§10.1. Reliance-Promissory Estoppel. In Loranger Construction 
Corp. v. E.F. Hauserman CO.,l the Supreme Judicial Court, in a decision 
upholding recovery on the basis of "typical bargain" analysis, shed some 
light on the status of the theory of promissory estoppel in Massachu-
setts.2 The plaintiff, Loranger Construction Corp. (Loranger), in pre-
paring its bid to become general contractor on a construction job, 
received by telephone a subcontract "quotation" of $15,900 for metal 
partitions from a sales engineer employed by defendant E.F. Hauser-
man Company (Hauserman).3 Although the quotation had been pre-
pared about two weeks earlier, it was not given to Loranger and other 
general contractors until May 20, 1968, the day bids were due on the 
general contract. Loranger, having received no other quotations on 
the partitions, submitted its bid using Hausennan's quotation, and was 
awarded the general contract in June, a month later.4 In September 
1968, Loranger sent Hauserman a subcontract agreement for signature 
with the $15,900 figure, which Hauserman rejected.1i Loranger then 
engaged another company to supply and install the partitions for 
$23,000.6 
Loranger brought anaotion against Hauserman to recover the $7,100 
difference between Hauserman's quoted price used in Loranger's bid 
and the amount paid to the substituted subcontractor.7 At the close of 
its evidence, Loranger waived ·all but the first count of its complaint, 8 
°DONNA M. SHERRY practices law with the Boston firm of Gaston Snow & 
Ely Bartlett. 
§10.1. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3020, 384 N.E.2d 176. 
2 Id. at 3022-27, 384 N.E.2d at 179·81. 
3 Id. at 3021-22, 384 N.E.2d at 178. 
4 Id. at 3022, 384 N.E.2d at 178. 
Ii Id. 
6Id. 
7 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 263, 264, 374 N.E.2d 306, 308. 
8 Id. Loranger's complaint contained four counts. In the fourth count, Loranger 
alleged that Hauserman's quotation was an offer which was accepted by Loranger 
after Loranger's bid on the general contract had been accepted. Id. 
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which alleged that Hauserman's telephone quotation was an offer, which 
Loranger accepted and relied upon in submitting its bid on the general 
contract. n The defendant rested and moved for a direoted verdict, 
which was denied.10 The jury returned a verdiot for Loranger and 
Hauserman moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which 
also was denied. 11 
On appeal, the Appeals Court held that Loranger was entitled to 
recover "on the theory 'Of promissory estoppel, a basis for recovery not 
previously explicitly accepted in the courts of this Commonwealth." 12 
On further review, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment, 
but on the basis that the evidence supported a finding that there was 
a "typioal bargain"-offer and acceptance supported by consideration.13 
The Court also observed that the evidence wDuld support a finding on 
the basis of the plaintiff's reliance on the defendant's promise, as the 
Appeals Court held. The Court, however, rejected use of "the expres-
sion 'promissory estoppel,' since it tends to confusion rather than to 
clarity." 14 
The Appeals Court found that Loranger was foreclosed from recovery 
on any traditional contract theory because it could find nD evidence 'Of 
acceptance, a requisite element of the "typical bargain." 15 Consequently, 
the court adDpted the theory of promissDry estoppel as formulated in 
section 90 of the Restatement of Contracts, which allows recovery if 
"( 1) a promisDr makes a promise which he should reasonably expect 
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character 
on the part of the promisee, (2) the promise does induce such action 
or forbearance, and (3) injustice can be avoided only by enfDrcement 
of the promise." 16 The court then applied this theory to the facts. 
Hauserman had submitted its bid knOWing that Loranger might use it 
in the general bid. Hauserman realized that if its quotatiDn were used 
and Loranger were awarded the general contract, Loranger wDuld be 
bound by its bid price. Because Hauserman later rejected the sub-
oontract, Loranger was forced to pay a higher price to another sub-
contractorP On these facts, the Appeals Court stated, "[tlhe jury could 
have found that Loranger had relied upon Hauserman's quotation, that 
9 [d. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3022, 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
11 [d. 
12 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 265, 374 N.E.2d at 308. 
13 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3026, 384 N.E.2d at 180. 
14 [d. at 3024, 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
15 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 265, 374 N.E.2d at 308. 
16 [d. (citing RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932». 
17 [d. at 268-89, 374 N.E.2d at 309. 
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the reliance was reasonable, and that injustice could be avoided only 
by the imposition of appropriate damages." 18 
In its petition to the Supreme Judicial Court for further appellate 
review, Hauserman set forth several arguments relating to the question 
whether the evidence made a case for the jury. It contended that the 
Appeals Court decision, resting on "the new theory of promissory estop-
pel," departed from the pleadings and from the theory on which the 
case was tried." III In observing that the Appeals Court holding was 
based on Loranger's reliance on Hauserman's promise, the Court held 
that the promise was "enforceable pursuant to a 'traditional contract 
theory,' "20 rather than "promissory estoppel." 21 Thus, it agreed that 
the holding was supported by the evidence. 22 Since, however, the 
charge to the jury was based on offer, acceptance, and consideration, 
with no reference to reliance on a promise,23 the Court went on to 
consider whether the evidence supported the jury's finding. 
In reviewing the eVidentiary basis for the jury's finding, the Court 
stated that the jury was warranted in its finding that Hauserman's 
quotation, in the circumstances, was an offer or promise. 24 In contrast 
to the Appeals Court's finding, the Court stated that the jury could 
have found that Loranger accepted Hauserman's offer in anyone of 
three ways: ( 1) an exchange of promises during the telephone con-
versation; (2) the doing of an act-using Hauserman's estimate in 
submitting the general bid; or (3) the offer, unrevoked, was accepted 
18 ld. at 269, 374 N.E.2d at 309-10. 
10 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3024, 384 N.E.2d at 179-80. 
20 ld., 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
21 ld. The Court labeled the holding of the Appeals Court as reliance on the 
promise. See text at note 14 supra. The Court also observed that this is not a 
"novel" doctrine as Hauserman had contended in its petition for further appellate 
review, but rather is "a 'traditional contract theory' antedating the modern doctrine 
of consideration." 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3024, 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
22 ld. at 3023, 384 N .E.2d at 179. 
23 ld. at 3025, 384 N.E.2d 180. The defendant Hauserman contended that the 
Appeals Court deciSion, "resting on 'the new theory of promissory estoppel,' departed 
from the pleadings and from the. theory on which the case was tried." ld. at 3024, 
384 N.E.2d at 179-80. The Court pointed out that the plaintiffs complaint alleged 
an exchange of promise for promise, as well as the submission of a bid in reliance 
upon the agreement between the parties, and that, if either allegation was sustained 
by proof, the other could be treated as surplusage. ld. at 3024-25, 384 N.E.2d at 
180. The Court also reviewed the judge's charge to the jury. Since the charge 
made no reference to reliance on a promise, it found that it could not "attribute. to 
the jury a finding that the offer or promise of the defendant induced action 'of a 
substantial character' on the part of the plaintiff." ld. at 3025, 384 N.E.2d at 
180. Such a finding is an essential element of the reliance doctrine" See text at 
note 16 supra. Consequently, the Court considered the case on the basis on which 
it was submitted to the jury. 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3025, 384 N.E.2d at 180. 
24 ld. at 3023, 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
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when Loranger sent the subcontract agreement,25 The Court stated 
that the jury would have been warranted in finding both that Hauser-
man invited acceptance in anyone of these three ways and that Lor.an-
ger's promise or act constituted consideration, the only remaining ele-
ment necessary to make Hauserman's promise binding.26 The Court 
applied the Restatement description of the "typical bargain" in which 
"the consideration and the promise bear a reciprocal relation of motive 
or inducement: the consideration induces the making of the promise 
and the promise induces the furnishing of the oonsideration." 27 Thus, 
the Court reasoned, the jury could have found that Hauserman's sales 
engineer intended to induce Loranger's promise or action in the hope 
that Hauserman would benefit and that his offer or promise was induced 
by the hoped-for acceptance.28 Even more clearly, the jury could have 
found that Loranger's promise or action was induced by Hauserman's 
offer or promise.2v These findings would warrant the conclusion that 
there was a "typical bargain" supported by ·consideration.3o The Court 
concluded that a review of the oases suggests that many decisions based 
on reliance might also have 'been based on bargain.,31 
The Court, by finding consideration and "bargain," did not need to 
consider the reliance theory of section 90 of the Restatement. In de-
clining to consider this theory, the Court noted the apparent confusion 
surrounding the phrase "promissory estoppel." 32 Despite such confu-
sion, the Supreme judicial Court nevevtheless made it dear that the 
dootrine of enforceability because of detrimental reliance will be ap-
plied in the appropriate case. 
§IO.2. Third-Party Beneficiary Contracts. In Choate, Hall & Stewart 
v. SeA Services, Inc.,! the Supreme Judicial Court jOined the vast ma-
jority of jurisdictions 2 in recognizing the right of a creditor beneficiary 
to sue on a contract to which it is not a party.3 While announcing this 
"long anticipated but relatively minor change" 4 in Massachusetts law, 
25 Id. at 3025-26, 384 N.E.2d at ISO. 
26 Id. at 3026, 384 N .E.2d at 180. 
27 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75, Conunent b (Tent. 
Drafts Nos. 1-7, 1973)). 
28 Id. at 3026, 384 N.E.2d at 180. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 3027, 384 N.E.2d at 180. See Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and 
Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 368-71 (1969). 
32 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3024, 384 N.E.2d at 179. 
§1O.2. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1877, 392 N.E.2d 1045. 
2 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRACTS § 135 (Tent. Drafts Nos. 1-7, 
1973). 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1877, 392 N.E.2d at 1046. 
4 Id. 
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the Court also presaged a change in the choice of law applicable in 
contract cases.5 
The contract at issue arose in 1976 out of a dispute within the eight-
member board of directors of SCA Services, Inc. (Company), a Dela-
ware corporation engaged in the waste disposal business.6 The dispute 
involved allegations that a former president and treasurer of the Com-
pany had diverted Company funds unlawfully with the possible knowl-
edge and/or assistance 6f some of the members of the board.7 The 
hoard of directors, divided on the issues, was at an impasse, and four 
separate lawsuits had been commenced involving the Company, its 
former president, and several members of the board of directors includ-
ing Steir, the chairman of the board.s 
The dispute was settled by a contract among the eight directors and 
the Company, providing for the dismissal with prejudice of the pending 
lawsuits, mutual releases, and the resignations as directors and officers 
of half of the board members.1) The provision of the settlement contract 
at issue in the present case required the company to 
"continue to indemnify and hold hannless" each of the resigning 
directors for "all losses, liabilities or expenses" incurred by him result-
ing "from any acts or omissions to ,act . . . while a director, officer 
or employee of [the Company] ... and each of the [reSigning 
directors] may select his own counsel whose reasonable fees and 
out-of-pocket expenses will 'be paid on a current basis directly by 
[the Company], 'all to the maximum extent permissible under Dela-
ware law." 10 
This obligation expressly included legal fees and expenses arising from 
a then-pending investigation of the Company by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC).lI 
During the settlement negotiations, one of the directors, Steir, was 
represented by the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart (Choate, Hall) .12 
The Company paid attorneys representing the other resigning directors 
and paid Choate, Hall on two statements of fees and expenses for 
representing Steir in the SEC investigation.13 Thereafter it refused 
payment to Steir's attorneys, Choate, Hall, apparently upon learning of 
5 rd. at 1882-85, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. See text at notes 24-30 infra. 
6 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1877-78, 392 N.E.2d at 1046. 
7 rd. at 1878, 392 N.E.2d at 1046. 
8 rd., 392 N.E.2d at 1046-47. 
I) rd. at 1879, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
10 rd. at 1879-80, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
11 rd. at 1880, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
12 rd. at 1880-81, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
13 rd. 
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an SEC detennination to bring suit.14 The Company took the position 
that it would decline further payment of legal fees and expenses of 
Steir until Steir either vindicated himself in the SEC matter or restored 
to the Company the funds ($125,000) it claimed Steir had misappro-
priated.15 
Choate, Hall brought suit in superior court against the Company, 
seeking a declaratory judgment.16 Choate, Hall also sought and ob-
tained (on condition that it post bond) a preliminary injunction en-
joining the Company from failing !o pay Choate, Hall's bills previously 
submitted or bills that would be submitted for later work on Steir's 
behalf.17 The Company's,answer included several affinnative defenses: 
( 1) Choate, Hall was not a party to the settlement contract and there-
fore could not sue to enforce it; (2) indemnification was unlawful in 
the circumstances; and (3) the provision sued upon had been procured 
by misrepresentations on the part of Steir.18 In addition, the Company 
included a claim to set off $125,000, the funds allegedly misappropriated 
by Steir, against any recovery to which Choate, Hall would be other-
wise entitled. HI 
The Company moved for judgment on the pleadings on its first af-
finnative defense, that Choate, Hall could not sue to enforce a settlement 
contract to which it was not a party, and affidavits were submitted by 
both parties.20 Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, the 
judge granted summary judgment for the Company and denied Choate, 
Hall's motions to amend its complaint to substitute Steir for itself as 
plaintiff in the action and as party to the preliminary injunotion.21 Later, 
the judge granted the Company's motion to enforce liability on the bond 
obligation.22 Choate, Hall's appeals from the summary judgment, denial 
of its motions to substitute, and judgment on the bond were consolidated 
and the Supreme Judicial Court ordered direct appellate review.23 
In reversing the trial judge's decision, the Court focused on two 
issues: (1) choice of law and (2) suit by a third-party beneficiary.24 
The first issue was significant at the superior court level because, prior 
14 ld. at 1881, 392 N.E.2d at 1047. The. Company continue.d to make payments 
to attorneys representing another director, however, apparellll:l.y because he had 
"made good" the amounts he earlier misappropriated. ld., 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
15 ld., 392 N.E.2d at 1047. 
16 ld., 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. 
19 ld. at 1881-82, 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
20 ld. at 1882, 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. The bond obligation was in the amount of $34,526.31. 
231d. 
24 ld. 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 13
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/13
306 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §10.2 
to this case, the law of Massachusetts on third-party beneficiary contracts 
differed from the law of Delaware.25 The Court concurred with the 
judge below that the reference in the contract to Delaware law 26 did 
not indicate that Delaware law should govern all issues.2i Rather, the 
Court stated, the contract reference referred to the Delaware corpora-
tion law merely to fix the permissible extent of corporate indemnification 
of directors and officers.28 Noting that the contract was executed in 
Massachusetts and that most of the contacts were with Massachusetts,2U 
the Court ruled that Massachusetts law governed.30 
Having determined that Massachusetts law would govern the out-
come, the Court briefly reviewed "[t]he rather confusing patchwork" 31 
of the third-party beneficiary rule in Massachusetts. The Court began 
by noting that it had adopted, in Mellen v. WhippZe,32 the doctrine of 
privity of contract as the law of Massachusetts.33 The Court agreed 
with commentators that, despite formal adherence to the Mellen doc-
trine, the Court's various exceptions to the general prohibitory rule of 
Mellen have resulted in the implicit recognition of the right of suit of 
creditor beneficiaries.34 Thus, Massachusetts courts in fashioning "ex-
ceptions" have actually reached results similar to the results of jurisdic-
tions which recognize third-party beneficiary contracts.35 There has 
been uncertainty, however, concerning the scope of various exceptions. 
Consequently, the Court adopted the general rule recognizing the right 
of third-party creditor beneficiaries to sue 36 and applied it retroactively 
to permit Choate, Hall's suit.3i 
25 ld. 
26 See text at note 10 supra. 
27 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1884, 392 N.E.2d at 1049. 
281d. 
29 ld. The Court noted that Choate, Hall is a "Boston partnership" (presumably 
meaning a partnership formed under Massachusetts law and located in Boston), that 
the Company's principal place of business is in Massachusetts, that Steir resides 
in Massachusetts, and that the only contact with Delaware was that it was the 
Company's state of incorporation. ld. 
30 ld. at 1882, 392 N.E.2d at 1048. 
31 ld. at 1888, 392 N.E.2d at 1051. 
32 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 317, 321 (1854). 
33 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1886, 392 N.E.2d at 1050. 
34 ld. at 1887-88, 392 N.E.2d at 1050-51. 
35 ld. 
36 ld. at 1888-89, 392 N .E.2d at 1051. The Court uses the term "creditor" 
beneficiary as defined in the original RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS § 133 (1932). 
1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1891 n.21, 392 N.E.2d at 1052 n.21. In the original RE-
STATEMENT, "intended beneficiary" explicitly encompassed the categories of creditor 
and donee beneficiaries as defined therein. The second RESTATEMENT abandons 
this specific terminology in favor of the general inclusive term "intended beneficiary" 
but retains the now nameless classifications. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 133(1)(a)-(b) (1973). 
37 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1889, 392 N.E.2d at 1051. The Court noted that 
"the handwriting has long been on the wall," regarding adoption of the general 
7
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In applying the general rule to the facts of the case, the Court looked 
to the intention of the parties to detennine whether Choate, Hall quali-
fied as a creditor beneficiary entitled to sue the promisor, or whether it 
was no more than an incidental beneficiary without right of suit. 38 The 
basic test is whether the perfonnance promised will satisfy an obligation 
of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary.30 In general, third 
parties are not accorded a right of action against an indemnitor to 
recover payments due an indemnitee.40 In this case, however, as the 
Court noted, although words of indemnity were used, the contract 
provided that the payments would be made "directly" to Steir's counsel, 
evidencing an intention to benefit the third party, Choate, Hall, and 
thus qualifying Choate, Hall as a creditor beneficiary.,n 
In finally espousing the general rule relating to creditor beneficiaries, 
the Court has laid the groundwork for even further changes in Massa-
chusetts contract law. Although, as the Court observed,42 the choice 
of law issue was easily resolved in this particular case under existing 
Massachusetts law,43 the Court clearly suggests that change in the 
choice-of-Iaw test applicable in contract cases is imminent.44 Just as 
the Court has reexamined the choice-of-Iaw approach in tort cases,45 the 
Court apparently plans to change the rule in contract cases from the 
choice of the law of the place where the contraot was made 46 to a 
more functional approach.47 
§1O.3. Employment Contracts-Forfeiture for Competition Clauses-
Employer's Good Faith. In Cheney v. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of 
America,! the Supreme JudiCial Court expanded the notion of employer 
"good faith" espoused in 1977 in Fortune v. National Cash Register CO.2 
rule. Id. See, e.g., Falmouth Hoop. v. Lopes, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2801, 382 
N.E.2d 1042. 
38 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1889, 392 N.E.2d at 1051. 
39 Id. at 1889-90, 392 N.E.2d at 1051. See note 36 supra. 
40 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1889, 392 N.E.2d at 1051. 
41 Id. at 1890, 392 N.E.2d at 1052. 
42 The Court stated: "The facts of the IX'esent case deprive us of an opportunity 
to elect among the extant doctrines .... " 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1884, 392 N.E.2d 
at 1049. 
43 See text at 24-30 supra. 
44 Id. at 1882-85, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
45 See Pevoski v. Pe¥oski, 371 Mass. 358, 359-61, 358 N.E.2d 416, 417-18 (1976). 
46 See Cameron v. Gunstock Acres, Inc., 370 Mass. 378, 381-82, 348 N.E.2d 791, 
793 (1976); Dicker v. Klein, 360 Mass. 735, 736, 277 N.E.2d 514, 515-16 (1972.). 
47 The Court obse,rved that "reference to the law of the place of making can 
produce awkward or arbitrary results . . . , and almost all States have replaced 
place-of-making or other one-factor tests with a more functional approach." 1979 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1883, 392 N.E.2d at 1048-49. 
§10.3. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 179, 385 N.E.2d 961. 
2 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
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In revising a judgment dismissing a complaint seeking recovery of cer-
tain deferred compensation benefits, the Court enunciated the relevant 
considerations concerning the enforceability of a forfeiture for competi-
tion clause in an employment contract. 
Cheney, the plaintiff, was an employee of the defendant Automatic 
Sprinkler Corporation of America (Corporation) from 1956 to 1972. He 
served as salesman, then district manager, and finally eastern regional 
vice president, under a series of one-year contracts, each apparently 
containing similar provisions.3 The contract prOvided for a base salary, 
a direct incentive payment based on a certain percentage of the annual 
operating profit of the employee's district, and a bonus.4 Any direct 
incentive payment for one year would be paid during the first quarter 
of the next year up to an amount equal to fifty percent of the employee's 
base salary, with the remainder to be paid in equal amounts during the 
first quarter of each of the follOwing four years.5 Bonuses for each year 
were to be determined by a compensation committee and paid from a 
bonus fund during the first quarter of each of the succeeding four years, 
in equal amounts.6 The contraot further provided that the award of 
any direct incentive or bonus was wholly discretionary with the Cor-
poration and that "no person [would] be deemed to have earned or ac-
quired any right thereto at any time prior to actual receipt of payment." 7 
In addition, the contract provided: 
One who dies, retires, or leaves the Corporation with the approval 
of the Board of Directors will receive all direot incentive and bonus 
installments as described above. One who is discharged for cause, 
terminates his employment, joins a competitor, or engages in activi-
ties which are harmful to the Corporation, will forfeit all install-
ments which remain unpaid on the date of the occurrence of any 
of such events. However, final authOrity over the payment or for-
feiture of direct incentive and bonus installments will be vested in 
the Compensation Committee. 8 
In June 1972, Cheney reSigned from the Corporation to form a com-
peting company,9 and the Corporation discontinued all direct incentive 
3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 180, 385 N.E.2d at 962. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 180-81, 385 N.E.2d at 962-63. 
6 Id. at 181, 385 N.E.2d at 963. 
7 Id. at 181 & n.1, 385 N.E.2d at 963 & n.!. 
8 Id. at 181 n.1, 385 N.E.2d at 963 n.!. 
DId. at 182-83, 385 N.E.2d at 963. The Court treated the pleadings as in-
cluding an allegation that the plaintiff reSigned to form a competing corporation, 
although this representation was made only in plaintiffs brief. Id. at 183, 385 
N.E.2d at 963. Plaintiff averred that defendant was aware of his intent when it 
accepted plaintiffs resignation. Id. 
9
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and installment payments. 10 Cheney brought suit in superior court 
against his fonner employer to recover $34,800 in unpaid direct incen-
tive installments and $14,000 in unpaid bonus installments attributable 
to the years 1968 through 1971 under the employment contracts,u After 
Cheney filed a more definite statement pursuant to the Corporation's 
motion, the superior court allowed the Corporation's motion to dismiss.12 
The Supreme Judicial Court transferred Cheney's appeal,13 
Acknowledging that under the employment contract Cheney clearly 
had no explicit right to unpaid incentive and bonus installments when 
he left the Corporation's employ to work for a competitor, on appeal 
the Court considered "whether there [was] any theory under which, in 
the circumstances, the discretionary provisions of the agreement should 
not be enforced." 14 The Court recognized that its previous decisions 
had upheld agreements providing for the loss of unpaid compensation 
if a former employee went to work for a competitor.15 It noted that 
the majority view in other jurisdictions is that "a forfeiture for com-
petition clause in an employment agreement is enforceable without 
regard to the reasonableness of the restraint on the fonner employee." 16 
Nonetheless, the Court stated that, just as it would reconstruct a cove-
nant not to compete, so it would enforce a forfeiture of deferred com-
pensation only to the extent that the restraint is reasonable,17 
On this basis the Court ruled that the complaint and the more definite 
statement failed to allege a claim on which relief could be granted, 
because they failed to include any allegations of fact indicating "( a) 
that the defendant acted in bad faith in denying further payments to 
the plaintiff or (b) that the provision denying benefits if the plaintiff 
went to work for a competitor was an unreasonable restraint on the 
plaintiff." 18 The Court, however, permitted Cheney to amend his com-
plaint.10 In reaching its decision, the Court enumerated the considera-
tions appropriate in detennining the reasonableness of a clause providing 
10 Id. at 182, 385 N.E.2d at 963. 
11 Id. at 179, 182, 385 N.E.2d at 962, 963. 
12 Id. at 179, 385 N.E.2d at 962. 
13 Id. at 179-80, 385 N.E.2d at 962. 
14 Id. at 183, 385 N.E.2d at 964. 
15 See Flynn v. Murphy, 350 Ma~s. 352, 215 N.E.2d 109 (1966); Chase v. New 
York Life Ins. Co., 188 Mass. 271, 74 N.E. 325 (1905); see also Union Cent. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Coolidge, 357 Mass. 457, 259 N.E.2d 188 (1970). 
10 See, e.g., Rochester Corp. v. Rochester, 450 F.2d 118, 122-23 (4th Gir. 1971); 
Woodward v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 396 Mich. 379, 383-84, 240 N.W.2d 710, 
711 (1976). See generaUy Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1968); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 
1066 (1962). 
17 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 187, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
18 Id. at 190, 385 N.E.2d at 966. 
19 Id. 
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for the forfeiture of post-termination financial benefits: the amount and 
nature of the forfeiture and the nature of the employee's duties and 
responsibilities in his former and current employment.2o The Court 
noted that if in the circumstances a covenant not to compete would 
be unenforceable, the burden of justification of a forfeiture clause would 
be "onerous." 21 The Court stated that even if a covenant not to com-
pete would be reasonable in the circumstances, a forfeiture clause 
"might be modified to a reasonable level." 22 Applying these considera-
tions to the allegations of the complaint, the Court stated that it found 
"no allegation, or even a hint, of facts that would justify relief . . .. " 23 
In Cheney, the Court adopts an approach to "forfeiture" or "divest-
ment" clauses that has been recommended by commentators.24 Among 
the possible contractual provisions to induce employees to remain in 
their present employment positions, a clause providing for forfeiture of 
incentive payments acts as a positive deterrent and a covenant not to 
compete acts as a negative sanction. As the Court points out, however, 
each provision may have an inhibitory effect on present and former 
employees in much the same way.25 Consequently, the Court reasoned, 
if forfeiture prOvisions are enforced without regard to the reasonableness 
of their terms, while noncompetition covenants are subject to such a 
test, some employers may be tempted to rely on the threat of forfeiture 
as a means of restraining employees from seeking employment with 
competitors.26 
The Cheney opinion does more, however, than simply compare for-
feiture clauses with noncompetition covenants. In setting forth the two 
areas of vulnerability of forfeiture dauses-employer bad faith and 
unreasonable restraint 27-the Court further expands the notion of em-
ployer "good faith" imported into employment contracts in 1977 by 
20 ld. at 187, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. at 188, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
23 ld. at 189, 385 N.E.2d at 966. In fact, the, Court noted that Cheney had 
been employed in key sales positions for the Corporation, ending his employment 
in a position with responsibility for a wide geographic area, circumstances which 
would "tend tOJ'ustify restraints on the plaintiff's assumption of competing employ-
ment .... " I. at 190 n.9, 385 N.E.2d at 966 n.9. 
24 ld. at 186, 385 N.E.2d at 965. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Antitrust's Neglected 
Stepchild: A Proposal for Dealing with Restrictive Covenants Under Federal Law, 
73 COLUM. L. REv. 1193 (1973); Koehn & Ptacek, Employer Protection Against 
Loss of the Key Employee, 57 IOWA L. REV. 75 (1971); Comment, Forfeiture of 
Pension Benefits for Violation of Covenants Not to Compete, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 290 
(1966). 
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 187 n.7, 385 N.E.2d at 965 n.7. 
26 ld. 
27 ld. at 190, 385 N.E.2d at 966. 
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Fortune v. National Cash Register CO.28 Furthermore, the Court sug-
gests that a stricter test of "reasonableness" will be applied to forfeiture 
clauses than to noncompetition covenants. 29 
In Fortune, the Court implied a covenant of good faith in an employ-
ment contract tennmable at will. It expressly attempted to limit its 
holding to ,the employer's decision to tenninate its at-will employee 
where commissions are to be paid for work perfonned by theemployee.3o 
The Cheney decision, by suggesting a different result if the plaintiff 
alleged that the employer had aoted in bad faith in denying further 
payments,31 expands the applicability of the good faith requirement to 
cover the employer's decision to not pay discretionary incellltive pay-
ments after termination, if the employee goes to work for a competitor. 
The Fortune case is now cited for the proposition that an employer 
may not rely on the express terms of its agreement with an employee 
in order to avoid payment of compensation attributa:ble to past services.32 
It remains unclear, however, whether the requirement of good faith is 
tantamount to a good cause standard, what measure of damages should 
be applied, and what proof is required to establish a prima facie case. 
Although the "bad faith" issue was not treated at length in Cheney, 
the Gourtdid elaborate on this second ground for attack on a forfeiture 
clause, namely, that a forfeiture clause, like a noncompetition clause, is 
an unreasonable restraint on the employee.33 The rule in Massachusetts 
applicable to covenants not to compete generally is that they are en-
forceable only to the extent they are necessary to protect the legitimate 
business interests of the employer.34 These interests include trade 
secrets, confidential data, and goodwill. The restraint must be limited 
reasonably in time and space.35 The Court stated that even if a forfeiture 
clause passes the test applicable to noncompetition oovenants, the for-
feiture clause still may be modified to a "reas:onable level." 36 The 
applicable oonsiderations are: (1) the amount and nature of the for-
feiture and (2) the nature of the employer's duties and responsibilities 
28 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). 
29 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188, 385 N.E.2d at 965. See text at note 14 supra. 
30 373 Mass. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257-58. For a more complete discussion 
of the Fortune case, wherein it is suggested that the Court's struggle to avoid estab-
Us'rung a new general rule may be unsuccessful, see Sherry, Contracts and Com-
mercial Law, 1978 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 8.2, at 151-58. 
31 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 190, 385 N.E.2d at 966. 
32 ld.at 190 n.9, 385 N.E.2d at 966 n.9. 
33 ld. at 186-88, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
34 ld. at 186, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
35 ld. For a more complete discussion, see Sherry, Contracts and Commercial 
Law, 1978 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW § 8.3, at 158-63. 
36 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 188, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
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in his former and current employment.37 Therefore, following Cheney, 
in order to show reasonable circumstances for a forfeiture clause, the 
employer should carefully draft the clause to recite his interest in provid-
ing a financial inducement to a key employee to continue to work for 
the employer. Furthermore, if a forfeiture clause is attacked, consid-
eration should be given to shOWing that loss of compensation is reason-
able in the particular circumstances and is far less restrictive than a 
noncompetition clause. 
37 ld. at 187, 385 N.E.2d at 965. 
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